Introduction
All three of the main regional human rights treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, have been interpreted to include a specific, positive duty to investigate violations of the right to life. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the jurisprudence on point of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights and the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. It will consider whether there is harmonization or fragmentation of international human rights law in this area; what the consequences are for human rights protection and whether harmonization is desirable in those areas related to the duty to investigate, such as reparations, where strong divergence is found across the regional systems.
The chapter seeks first to analyse the nature of the investigative duty and its various elements, as well as how it arises. It considers to what extent there are differences in investigatory standards as between individual and systemic cases, and as between enforced disappearances and other right to life cases. It assesses the legitimacy of domestic amnesty laws and statutes of limitation and the application by the three regional systems of admissibility criteria and the burden of proof. Finally, it considers the inter-relationship of the right to life and the right to know the truth, before turning to the question of reparations.
The duty to investigate
The duty to investigate fatal incidents derives in each of the regional treaties not only from the specific substantive provisions on the right to life, but also from the more general obligations to ensure that the rights in the treaties are upheld, namely Article 1(1) of the American Convention '…the first proceedings with all diligence….State authorities that carry out an investigation must, inter alia, a) identify the victim; b) recover and preserve the evidentiary material related to the case; c) identify possible witnesses and obtain their statements with regard to the death that is being investigated; d) determine the cause, form, place, and moment of death, as well as any proceeding or practice that could have caused it, and e) distinguish between a natural death, an accidental death, a suicide, or a homicide. Besides, it is necessary to thoroughly investigate the crime scene, autopsies and competent professionals employing the most appropriate procedures must carefully practice analysis of the human remains.' 16 A further requirement, identified by the Inter-American Court in Velásquez Rodríguez and cited expressly by the African Commission, is that the investigation should be 'serious'. However, this does not appear to have a different meaning to the need to conduct a diligent investigation. According to the Inter-American Court, the State has a legal duty ''to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation''. 17 Equally, the Court has maintained that ''an investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government''. To this, the African Commission has added that the seriousness of the investigation must be evaluated 'through the actions of both State agencies and private actors on a case-by-case basis'. 18 The Commission has therefore required that States 'use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation'. 19 Furthermore, where new evidence subsequently comes to light, an effective investigation requires that State authorities are 'sensitive to any information or material which has the potential either to undermine the conclusions of an earlier investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive investigation to be pursued further'. 20 In making such assessments, the authorities are entitled to take account of the passage of time and the prospects of success:
'the fresh obligation to investigate will vary according to the nature of the purported new evidence or information. It may be restricted to verifying the reliability of the new evidence and the authorities can legitimately take into account the prospects of launching a new prosecution at such a late stage. Due to the lapse of time, the level of urgency may have diminished; the immediacy of required investigative steps in the aftermath of an incident is likely to be absent'. 21 Whilst recognizing the challenges of access to witnesses in such circumstances, which may impair the availability of sufficient evidence for a prosecution, the European Court has held that the authorities 'must take reasonable steps to find the available evidence and pursue the practicable leads open to them at this time to discover the perpetrators of any unlawful violence', and that 'the families should be kept informed of any key factual conclusions and procedural developments and any reasoned decisions in this regard '. 22 How far does the effectiveness obligation extend?
For the European Court, whilst the requirements of Article 2 do not, as such, guarantee a right to have criminal proceedings instituted against third parties, 23 they do extend beyond the stage of the official investigation, where this has led to the institution of proceedings in the national courts. In that situation, the proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the requirements of the positive obligation to protect lives through the law. Thus, instigating criminal proceedings, which are then pursued effectively, will usually be sufficient to meet the Article 2 requirement to investigate a fatality. 24 The Strasbourg Court has emphasized that 'in the normal course of events a criminal trial, with an adversarial procedure before an independent and impartial judge must be regarded as furnishing the strongest safeguards of an effective procedure for the finding of facts and the attribution of criminal responsibility'. 25 However, criminal proceedings which fail to address a 'crucial issue' (even where some suspects are tried, convicted and sentenced), 26 or which fail to include a particular individual/company, 27 or which are not sufficiently prompt, 28 may violate Article 2. Furthermore, inadequate reasoning of domestic courts in acquitting state officials may breach Article 2, 29 as may the imposition of only relatively light sentences 30 or the failure to ensure that those convicted serve their sentences. 31 Although the African Commission has not elaborated as to precisely how far it considers the right to life extends, the Inter-American Court, like the European Court, requires that the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators should be effective. Incidents of torture, killing and enforced disappearance 'entail the activation of national and international measures, instruments and mechanisms to ensure their effective prosecution and the sanction of the 22 
Is it an obligation of means or result?
Both the Inter-American and European bodies have held that the duty to investigate represents an obligation of means, not of result. Thus the European Court, for example, accepts that not every investigation will necessarily be successful. 34 At the same time, the Inter-American Court has underlined that the obligation cannot be fulfilled as ''a simple formality predestined to be unsuccessful' 35 but that it must be 'directed at a specific goal, the determination of the truth and the investigation, pursuit, capture, prosecution and, as appropriate, punishment of those responsible for the facts'. 36 The European Court has insisted that the investigation must be 'capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible'. 37 The African Commission appears to take a different position, although this has not been expressed in the particular context of the duty to investigate, but rather in relation to the general obligation to give effect to the Charter rights (under Article 1). The Commission has held that Article 1: 'imposes on the States Parties the obligation of using the necessary diligence to implement the provisions prescribed by the Charter since the said diligence has to evolve in relation to the time, space and circumstances, and has to be followed by practical action on the ground in order to produce concrete results. …In fact, in the Commission's view, it is an obligation of RESULT that Article 1 of the African Charter imposes on the States Parties. In effect, each State has the obligation of guaranteeing the protection of the human rights written in the Charter by adopting not only the means that the Charter itself prescribes, in particular 'all the necessary legislative measures for this purpose but in addition measures of their choice that the Charter called for by Article 1 and it therefore defined as one of result '. 38 It clarifies this by drawing upon Articles 20 and 21 of the International Law Commission's Draft articles on State responsibility, Colozza v Italy, De Cubber v Belgium before the European Court and Avena before the ICJ, noting that: 'the distinction between the obligation of diligence and that of result should not make one lose sight of the fact that, all obligations contained in a Treaty, Convention or a Charter seek to attain an objective, a purpose or a result '. 39 Furthermore, in the same case the Commission found that: 
(iii) Promptness and reasonable expedition
For all three systems, the investigation must be prompt and carried out 'without delay'. 41 For the European Court while there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response is essential in maintaining public confidence in the authorities' adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in, or tolerance of, unlawful acts. 42 The requirement for promptness may be stricter in certain cases, such as, for the European Court, investigations into deaths in state custody. 43 In the Inter-American System, the obligation to investigate is also linked to important obligations deriving from Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention which regulate due process guarantees and the right to judicial and other remedies. Under Article 8 in conjunction with Article 1(1), States have an obligation to carry out an investigation within a reasonable period of time. This means both that the investigation into a fatality needs to be opened as soon as the State has notice of it and that it should be carried out within a reasonable period of time. Indeed, the Inter-American Court considers that 'the right to a fair trial requires that the determination of the facts under investigation and, if it were the case, of the corresponding criminal responsibilities be made effective in a reasonable period of time, reason for which, in attention to the need to guarantee the rights of the affected parties, a prolonged delay can constitute, in itself, a violation of the right to a fair trial'. 44
(iv) Independence and impartiality
All three systems underscore the importance of those undertaking the investigations to be impartial and independent from those implicated in the events. 45 The European Court and African Commission have clarified this further by noting elements of hierarchical, institutional and practical independence. 46 Judicial impartiality, for example, will be undermined 'when … a judicial official secretly participated in the investigation of a case'. 47
(v) Involvement of next of kin and victims
In all three regional systems it has been held that the victims or their next of kin have a right to be involved in the procedure if they so wish and to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests. 48 For the Inter-American system this principle also derives from the 44 importance attributed to the right to know the truth. 49 In addition, according to the Inter-American Court 'the state must ensure that the next of kin of the victims have full access and capacity to act at all stages and in all instances of the proceedings in accordance with the American The European Court has found that victims' families have not been able to participate sufficiently in investigations, where, for example, there was no legal aid and there were restrictions on the extent of the disclosure of case documents in an inquest, 52 or where the authorities failed to advise a family about the date of an inquest. 53
B. Triggering moment
At what point will the obligation to investigate come into existence? For the European Court, the principle is that the duty to investigate will arise 'where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the State'. 54 There are particular situations which will clearly trigger the obligation. For example, this will be the case when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force, 55 in cases of 'disappearances' in circumstances which may be regarded as life-threatening, 56 and for deaths in custody. 57 The duty arises, of course, whether or not state agents are implicated. Therefore, 'the mere fact the authorities were informed' of a murder will give rise to an obligation to investigate the circumstances surrounding 49 the death. 58 This is justified on the basis, in the case of homicide, 'not only because any allegations of such an offence normally give rise to criminal liability, but also because often, in practice, the true circumstances of the death are, or may be, largely confined within the knowledge of State officials or authorities'. 59
The Inter-American Court has not expressly indicated the triggering moment as regards the obligation to investigate violations of the right to life, although it has done so for torture cases. 60 This is because it has been a common feature of right to life cases that an investigation is formally opened, but that there is then undue delay or the authorities fail to meet the due diligence requirements. In Cotton Field v Mexico, for example, concerning the disappearance and killing of a woman and two girls, after the next of kin of the victims informed the authorities that their relatives were missing, an investigation was opened, but it proved to be only a formality: 'during the first 72 hours, the authorities merely registered the disappearances and the statements of those who reported them […] .' Therefore, 'apart from the formal routine procedures, the State did not submit any arguments or evidence about measures taken in the said period to mobilize its investigative mechanisms in a real and effective search for the victims.' 61 The African System has not provided express comment on this point, however, from the case law of the three regional systems it is possible to conclude that once State authorities know of a possible violation of the right to life they should open an investigation.
C. Differences in investigatory standards relating to systemic and isolated violations
In cases where gross and systematic human rights violations are at stake, the Inter-American Court has indicated that the standard of due diligence is higher than that applied in isolated cases. Thus, the Inter-American Court requires the State to 'determine by means of legal proceedings the patterns of joint actions' including all those involved and their levels of responsibility, 62 and to ensure that the authorities 'assess the systematic patterns that allowed grave human rights violations' to happen. Such investigations should take 'into account the complexity of this type of facts and of the structure in which the facts took place, thus avoiding omissions in the collection of evidence and in following up on logical lines of investigation'. 63 The European Court does not, as such, impose a higher standard of investigations in systemic cases, but the failure of the investigating authorities to make links between factually similar cases, and to co-ordinate their efforts, will be a relevant factor in deciding whether the obligation to carry out an effective investigation has been breached. 64 The African Commission has not clarified if the standard is different in such instances although, as will be seen below, it does not require the complainant to exhaust domestic remedies if there is prima facie evidence of 'serious or massive violations'.
D. Differences in investigatory standards relating to right to life and disappearance cases
The Inter-American Court has maintained that the nature of an enforced disappearance must shape the way the duty of due diligence is fulfilled by state authorities. So, it is not that the standard is applied differently, as such, but it is that the very nature of an enforced disappearance necessarily impacts upon the way the obligation to investigate is met by state authorities. The Court has stipulated that the state apparatus should take prompt and immediate action to ascertain the whereabouts of the victim as soon as it has been notified that a person has disappeared. 65 Disappearance cases are frequently characterized by the considerable passage of time since the person was last seen. This may make it difficult to locate eye-witness evidence or to identify and mount a case against the alleged perpetrators. However, the European Court has emphasized that, even in such a situation, the ambit of the procedural obligation is unambiguous. 66 The European Court also recognises that there is a consensus in international law that it should be possible to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes such as disappearances even many years after the events. 67
The Inter-American Court has laid down that acting in a timely manner includes having unrestricted access to places of detention and their documentation, the ability to cross-examine witnesses, as well as the judiciary and/or the prosecutor's office taking all the necessary measures to establish the whereabouts of the person. 68 The Inter-American Court has also held that for the authorities to be able to carry out their work adequately, they must be provided with 'the logistical and scientific resources necessary for the gathering and processing of the evidence and, specifically, of the powers to access the appropriate documents and information for the investigation of the facts denounced and obtain indicia or evidence of the location of the victims.' 69 Although the African Commission has drawn upon Inter-American Court jurisprudence in the context of disappearances, it has been less explicit in identifying whether the obligation to investigate is different in such contexts. 70 For the European Court, the procedural obligation to investigate will arise where there is an arguable claim that an individual, who was last seen in the custody of agents of the State, subsequently disappeared in a context which may be considered life-threatening. 71 Unlike an investigation into a killing, an investigation into a disappearance does not serve the sole purpose of establishing the circumstances and finding and punishing the perpetrator. The crucial difference in investigations into disappearances is that, by conducting an investigation, the authorities also aim to find the missing person or find out what happened to him or her. 72 Therefore, the obligation to investigate in the case of a disappearance will persist as long as the 66 fate of the person is unaccounted for. The ongoing failure to provide the requisite investigation will be regarded as a continuing violation for all three of the regional systems. 73 
E. Differences in investigatory standards where there is evidence of discrimination
Where other, potentially important factors are evident, such as discriminatory attitudes, the standards applicable to the obligation to carry out an effective investigation may also differ. For example, stricter obligations will arise in investigating racist violence under the European Convention, 74 or discrimination that involves violence against women under the American Convention and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women. 75 The African Commission has not yet been called upon to consider these issues.
Barriers to carrying out effective investigations
Impunity, de jure or de facto, has been a barrier to ensure that states in Europe, 76 Africa and the Americas carry out their duty to investigate human rights violations. Impunity has been particularly pervasive in the latter two regions due to the presence of armed conflicts or dictatorships, the absence of the rule of law, corruption, the over-riding need to achieve peace and reconciliation and configurations of power that make it extremely difficult to investigate large scale human rights violations. In the three regions, States have invoked amnesty laws, statutes of limitation, the principle of ne bis in idem and other similar legal institutions, the effects of which have been to prevent or hinder investigations. Therefore all three regional systems have consistently maintained that amnesty laws and The African Commission (and the European Court holding similarly 78 ) has taken note of 'consistent international jurisprudence suggesting that the prohibition of amnesties leading to impunity for serious human rights has become a rule of customary international law,' 79 referring to the Principles on Impunity, the jurisprudence and general comments of the Human Rights Committee, its own jurisprudence and that of the ICTY.
Admissibility and burden of proof

A. Jurisdiction ratione temporis
Many gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in the Americas region took place before the State in question had ratified the American Convention (Argentina 80 or Chile, 81 for example) or, at a time when the State had ratified the Convention but had not accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court (as in the case of Guatemala 82 ). The Court has acknowledged that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over matters that took place before the state in question ratified the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, however, it does exercise jurisdiction over incidents which originally took place before the date of ratification, but whose effects continued after that date, as, for example, in the case of enforced disappearances. 83 37 . In Serrano Cruz Sisters, the Inter-American Court made reference to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which states as follows: 'Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with continuing violations and an 'instantaneous act', holding disappearances to be the former as a 'violation that occurs and continues over time, until it ceases, that is, until the missing person is no longer disappeared'. 84 In the case of the Beneficiaries of the Late Norbert Zongo and others v. Burkina Faso, 85 the African Court drew a distinction between the fact of an assassination, in 1998, of a journalist and several of his companions (an instantaneous act), and the subsequent failure to investigate the case. The duty to investigate continued after the date when Burkina Faso accepted the jurisdiction of the Court (January 2004) and accordingly the Court had jurisdiction ratione temporis to consider it.
The Inter-American Court too has maintained that it can exercise jurisdiction over separate and independent violations related to the failure of the state to conduct an impartial and effective investigation. 86 The European Court has also found that the procedural obligation to investigate fatalities is a separate and autonomous dutyand, therefore, one that is, in the words of the Strasbourg regard to that party'. The European Court has also drawn a clear distinction, as regards the ratione temporis principle, as between killings and disappearances, the latter giving rise to a continuing procedural obligation to investigate that will persist as long as the victim's fate remains unaccounted for. See (2006), paras 47 to 49. The Court listed a series of examples of such violations which had arisen in previous cases: 'the decision of a judge not to allow the counsel for the defense to participate in the proceeding; the prohibition imposed on the counsels for the defense to interview their clients in private, to duly examine the record of the case, to forward evidence for the defense, to challenge incriminating evidence, and to prepare the arguments in due time; the intervention of 'faceless' judges and prosecutors; the torture or ill-treatment inflicted on the defendant to exact a confession from him; the failure to inform foreign detainees of their right to have consular assistance; and the violation of the principle of coherence or correlation between the charges and the judgment'. 87 European Court, Šilih v. Slovenia, Application No 71463/01, Judgment, 9 April 2009. See also European Court, Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 66, para 147. 88 The Human Rights Committee's assessment of the effectiveness of an investigation into a fatality is not limited to the right to life (Article 6 ICCPR), but also encompasses the right to an effective remedy (Article However, the European Court has been required to delve further into this issue, and has concluded that, in view of the principle of legal certainty, its temporal jurisdiction as regards the duty to investigate cannot be considered to be open-ended: there must therefore be a 'genuine connection' between the death and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State for the procedural obligations imposed by the right to life (Article 2) to come into effect. This means that a 'significant proportion' of the procedural steps should usually have taken place after the entry into force of the Convention, although the Court accepted that 'in certain circumstances the connection could also be based on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner' (the 'Convention values test'). 89 In the subsequent case of Janowiec and others v Russia, concerning the execution in 1940 of more than 21,000 Polish prisoners of war by the 2 ICCPR) and also the prohibition of inhuman treatment (Article 7 ICCPR). However, under the Covenant the right to an effective remedy can only be breached in conjunction with another substantive right, so if a death occurs outside the Human Rights Committee's temporal jurisdiction, there cannot be a breach of the right to an effective remedy (Article 2) in conjunction with the right to life (Article 6). See 2006), the Human Rights Committee found it had jurisdiction ratione temporis in relation to the investigation into the disappearance of Thomas Sankara, who had been abducted and murdered in 1987, prior to Burkina Faso becoming a party to the Optional Protocol in 1999. The Human Rights Committee declared admissible the complaints brought by Mr Sankara's widow and children arising from the failure to conduct an inquiry and prosecute the guilty parties, ultimately finding a violation of Article 7 (the prohibition of inhuman treatment), recognising the suffering experienced by his relatives (as well as a violation of Article 14 (the right to equality)). The European Court has found that the anguish and distress caused by the disappearance of a close relative may give rise to a violation of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR), reflecting the reactions and attitudes of the authorities once a particular situation has been brought to their attention (see, e.g., European Court, Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 66, para 200). See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para 15, which states, inter alia that 'a failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant'. 89 European Court, Šilih v Slovenia, supra n 86, para 163. Note, however, the extent of dissension to these tests as expressed in the various concurring and dissenting opinions to the Šilih judgment. For a 'genuine connection' to be established, both criteria must be satisfied: the period of time between the death as the triggering event and the entry into force of the Convention must have been reasonably short, and a major part of the investigation must have been carried out, or ought to have been carried out, after the entry into force (European Court, Janowiec and others v Russia, Applications Nos 55508/07 and 29520/09, Judgment, 21 October 2013, para 148).
Soviet Union (the Katyn massacre), the majority of the grand chamber further defined these conditions:
'a required connection may be found to exist if the triggering event was of a larger dimension than an ordinary criminal offence and amounted to the negation of the very foundations of the Convention. This would be the case with serious crimes under international law, such as war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, in accordance with the definitions given to them in the relevant international instruments'. 90 Applying the Šilih criteria, the majority of the grand chamber in Janowiec found that it could not examine the complaints about the failure to carry out an effective investigation, because of the ratione temporis principle, noting that Russia had ratified the Convention 58 years after the Katyn massacre, which took place more than ten years before the Convention itself came into existence. However, four dissenting judges 91 argued that as the killings of the Polish prisoners were war crimes, the Court should have distinguished the case and found a violation of the right to life. The dissenters objected to the majority's narrow interpretation as to which 'procedural acts' are covered by the investigative obligationthose limited to the particular interests of the injured party and excluding other broader types of inquiry, such as those seeking to establish a historical truth. What was more significant for the dissenters was the clear trend in international law towards the recognition of a right to truth in gross violation cases (relying, inter alia, on the case-law of the Human Rights Committee). 92 Furthermore, in the dissenters' view, the majority erred in finding that the Convention values test could not be applied to events pre-dating the adoption of the Convention, a principle which they argued to be inconsistent with international law. 93 
B. Exhaustion of domestic remedies and related temporal rules on submission of applications
There have been close parallels in the development of the exhaustion of domestic remedies criterion within the three regional mechanisms, all of which require an assessment of the availability, sufficiency and effectiveness of any domestic remedies on which a respondent Government seeks to rely. 94 Only the American Convention includes (in Article 46(2)) detailed explicit exceptions to the exhaustion rule where: a) the domestic legislation does not provide due process of law for the protection of the right that has allegedly been violated; b) the applicant has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or c) there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment. 95 In all three systems, the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies may not be applicable when human rights violations have been committed as part of a systemic or generalised practice, or where, as in the case of the African Commission, there is evidence of serious or massive violations. In Velásquez Rodríguez the Inter-American Court found that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies is discharged 'if there is proof of the existence of a practice or policy ordered or tolerated by the government', the effect of which is to prevent normal recourse to such remedies. 96 The Court concluded in the same case that as regards cases of disappearances in Honduras in the early 1980s, any remedies which theoretically may have been available were in fact ineffective as the imprisonments were clandestine, formal requirements made them inapplicable in practice, complaints were simply ignored by the authorities, or the authorities threatened and intimidated the lawyers and judges involved. Such evidence was provided by the Commission, which was able to show that habeas corpus and criminal complaints were ineffective. 97 In a similar vein, the European Court has found that applicants may be absolved from exhausting domestic remedies if there are 'special circumstances', for example, where 'the national authorities [remain] totally passive in the face of serious allegations of misconduct or 94 A link between the failure to investigate and the question of the assessment of the effectiveness of domestic remedies has also been made by the African Commission. In Article 19 v Eritrea, which concerned the incommunicado detention of journalists in the early 2000s, the Commission found that:
'Holding the victims incommunicado for over three years demonstrates a prima facie violation of due process of the law and in particular, Article 7 of the African Charter. By not taking any action to remedy the situation more than twelve months after the African Commission had been seized of the communication goes to demonstrate that the State has equally failed to demonstrate that domestic remedies are available and effective'. 99 The African Commission has also held that in the case of 'massive violations', 100 their pervasiveness means that the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies will not be applied, 'especially where the state took no steps to prevent or stop them'. 101 cases concerning deaths or disappearances to keep track of the progress of domestic investigations and to lodge their applications 'with due expedition' once they become aware (or should become aware) of the lack of an effective investigation. 104 Although it had been the European Court's practice not to apply the six months rule to cases of disappearance, on the basis that the time limit could not run in respect of continuing violations, in 2009 the grand chamber in Varnava and Others v Turkey found that there was an obligation on the relatives of the disappeared to act with the necessary expedition in order to avoid, for example, loss of evidence or witnesses being untraceable. Applicants must therefore 'make proof of a certain amount of diligence and initiative and introduce their complaints without undue delay'. 105 The European Court in Varnava took pains to acknowledge the uncertainty and confusion which frequently follows a disappearance case, and noted the consensus in international law that it should be possible to prosecute such serious cases many years later, 106 but it nevertheless concluded that applications in disappearance cases could be rejected as being out of time where there has been an excessive or unexplained delay by the applicants, after they became aware (or should have become aware) of the ineffectiveness of the domestic investigation, and where there is no immediate, realistic prospect of an effective investigation being provided in the future. The Court went on to stipulate that applications in complex disappearance cases should therefore be brought within 'several years' of the incident; a delay of ten years would require particular justification. 107 The approach of the Inter-American Commission has been different to that followed by the 
C. Burden of proof
Since its very first judgment, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, in 1988, the Inter-American Court has imposed an obligation on state authorities to produce information and evidence in circumstances where the applicants are simply unable to do so, noting that disappearances are 'characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim'. 109 Thus the Court has emphasised that 'the State cannot rely on the defense that the complainant has failed to present evidence when it cannot be obtained without the State's cooperation'. 110 Similarly, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court, the general position is that while the applicant bears the burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt, the burden will be shifted back to the government where the events in question fall largely within the 'exclusive knowledge' of the authorities, as is the case, for example, where a detainee dies whilst in state custody or in respect of any person who is found dead or injured, or who has disappeared, in an area which is under the state's exclusive control. 111 In such cases the authorities will bear the burden of providing a 'satisfactory and convincing explanation'. 112 The Court is also entitled to draw strong inferences from the non-disclosure of crucial documents. 113 Although in many of the African Commission's decisions the evidential basis for its findings is arguably unclear, 114 one can glean some general approaches. The applicant will need to submit a prima facie case to pass the admissibility requirements in Article 56 of the Charter. Although the applicant will have the burden of proving the allegations as part of the merits of the case, the response of the government and willingness to engage with the Commission will determine the extent of this burden. A 'blanket denial of responsibility' from the state will result in the Commission deciding the case on the basis of the facts presented by the applicant. 115 Although the African Commission has not always been consistent on this question, it has held that once the state contradicts the applicant, the burden of proof will shift to it. 116
Relationship between the duty to investigate and the right to know the truth
While the three regional systems recognise that there is a right to know the truth under international law, its treatment differs in part because of the varying socio-political contexts which shape the way they understand the right. The right to know the truth has been a pivotal element in the various transitional justice processes that have taken place in the Americas and Africa as illustrated by the cases of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, South Africa and Kenya, although in many cases such mechanisms have arguably been used to avoid dealing with criminal investigations (i.e. 'truth instead of justice'). In European states, in contrast, with the exception of the various measures taken following World War II, the right to know the truth has not been given the same degree of attention, even though victims continue to claim it. An illustration of this is the case of Spain where years after Franco's dictatorship, state authorities continue to deny the fulfilment of this right. Indeed, in a recent visit to that country by Pablo de Greiff, the Special Rapporteur on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence, concluded that in Spain "[t]he most serious shortcomings are to be found in the spheres of truth and justice. No State policy was ever established with respect to truth; there is no official information and no mechanisms for elucidating the truth". 117 A similar situation can be said to be taking place in Russia as illustrated by the Janowiec and others case v. Russia, which is discussed below.
The Inter-American and European Courts both recognise that victims, their next of kin and society as a whole have the right to know the truth about what happened. However, the two systems differ in their understanding of the relationship of the duty to investigate and the right to know the truth. For the Inter-American Court, the right to know the truth 'is subsumed in the right of the victim or his next of kin to obtain clarification of the facts relating to the violations and the corresponding responsibilities from the competent State organs, through the investigation and prosecution established in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.' 118 While more recently the Inter-American Court has been ready to concede that the right to know the truth can also involve other rights under the Convention such as the right of access to information under Article 13, there is an intimate relationship between the right to know the truth and the duty to investigate.
Consequently, the Court has held that the establishment of a truth commission, as valuable as it may be, is not sufficient to fulfil the obligation to investigate or the victim's right to know the truth. The State will still have an obligation to 'open and expedite criminal investigations to determine the corresponding responsibilities. ' 119 In contrast, the European Court has maintained that the duty to investigate and the right to know the truth are different. In the Janowiec v. Russia case, relating to the Katyn massacre (see section 4A above), the Court said that it 'considers that the reference to 'procedural acts' must be understood in the sense inherent in the procedural obligation under Article 2 or, as the case may be, Article 3 of the Convention, namely acts undertaken in the framework of criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings which are capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible or to an award of compensation to the injured party […]. This definition operates to the exclusion of other types of inquiries that may be carried out for other purposes, such as establishing a historical truth.' 120
The consequences of this approach are not without importance. For example, if the European Court decides that it has jurisdiction ratione temporis (see section 4A above) over the obligation to investigate, this would not necessarily include the right to know the truth, at least not in relation to establishing the truth outside legal proceedings. The Inter-American Court, however, would look at the wider dimensions of the right to know the truth when considering the obligation to investigate. There are signs, however, that the European Court may be willing to broaden its outlook. In the El-Masri case, concerning the phenomenon of 'extraordinary rendition', the Court explicitly recognised the negative impact that an inadequate investigation can have on the right to know the truth (not only of other victims of rendition, but also of the general public) and stated that an adequate investigation should lead both to the identification of the perpetrators and to establishing the truth of what happened. 121 Despite the establishment of truth and reconciliation bodies in a number of African states (South Africa, Liberia and Kenya, for example), and although the African Commission has recognised the right to know the truth, it has not defined its scope or reach in its communications. What it has done, however, is to require that there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny not only of the investigation but also of its results 122 to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. 123 The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case.
Reparations
The Inter-American Court and the African Commission share an expansive approach to the question of reparations. As regards cases of disappearances and extra-judicial executions, the Inter-American Court has frequently ordered the state to carry out investigations, it has upheld the right of relatives (and of wider society) to be informed about what happened, 124 and has ordered states to locate the remains of victims and provide them to the next-of-kin. 125 It has justified its position by explicitly finding that the nature and gravity of cases of gross violations of human rights may require more than a declaratory response. 126 It is important to note that the Inter-American Court does not distinguish between violations when awarding reparation; in other words, it will not indicate that the reparations awarded correspond to the violation of specific rights. However, a careful analysis of the grounds and evidence on which the Court makes such awards can establish a link between a particular reparations order and the duty to investigate. For example, a frequently awarded form of reparation by the Inter-American Court in right to life cases is the requirement for the publication of the judgment. 127 This can be considered to provide redress for a lack of due diligence in investigations, given that it enables others to know what were the particular failings in the investigation. The Court has also ordered that prosecutors, judges and members of the military or security forces, or other state institutions, be provided with training in particular areas of international human rights law and humanitarian law. 128 The Inter-American Court has also recognised that the grounds for claiming moral damages include the denial of justice and the persistence of impunity and has accordingly awarded compensation on equitable grounds on that basis. 129 Similarly, the practice of the African Commission is to call on states to carry out investigations in cases of killings or disappearances. 130 In disappearance cases or those involving massacres where victims are yet be found and identified, the Inter-American Court has also ordered that the effective search of the whereabouts of the victims should continue, stipulating detailed conditions. 134
In the Cotton Field case, concerning gender-based violence in Ciudad Juárez in Mexico, the Court not only required the respondent state to ensure the effective prosecution of such cases (in respect of both the perpetrators and masterminds) but also stipulated that the investigation must include a gender perspective and include specific lines of inquiry concerning sexual violence. 135 The Court may also stipulate that investigators should take account of systematic patterns of human rights violations. 136 The position of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to redress for failing to carry out effective investigations into cases of fatalities remains considerably undeveloped, in comparison to the stance of both the Inter-American Court and African Commission. 137 The European Court has developed its right to life jurisprudence notably in response to a series of cases from Romania 148 ). Having found that there had been widespread use of lethal force against the demonstrators, and that the subsequent investigation had been ineffective, because of the statutory limitation of criminal liability, the Court stipulated that the victims should therefore be 145 Ibid, para 221. The measures set out by the Court were not included in the operative provisions of the judgment, and accordingly, were not strictly legally binding on the respondent state. 146 Ibid, paras 222-238. 147 provided with an effective investigation 'in view also of the importance to Romanian society of knowing the truth about the events'. 149
Conclusions
Overall there is a striking similarity in the broad approach of the three regional systems in their interpretation and application of the duty to investigate in respect of right to life cases. Although the systems have employed differing wording to describe the essential nature of the duty to investigate (requiring either 'due diligence' or an 'effective official investigation'), each identifies six core elements: investigate on the state's own initiative; conduct an effective investigation; ensure promptness and reasonable expedition; maintain independence and impartiality; allow public scrutiny; and ensure the involvement of the next-of-kin. There are some differences in wording which do not, however, actually indicate a divergent approach (such as the Inter-American and African requirement for a 'serious' investigation).
Where some distinctions are apparent, these may in fact be more the result of lack of clarity on certain points (such as the burden of proof, the triggering moment, and the question whether the duty amounts to an obligation of result or one of means) rather than an actual difference in approach. Indeed, we would suggest that this chapter highlights a number of areas where there is a need for greater clarity from one or more of the regional systems. For example, whereas the European and Inter-American Courts have stipulated that the duty extends to the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators, that has yet to be clarified by the African institutions.
Other areas of divergence arguably stem from a comparatively larger number of cases in one of the regional systems which raise a particular serious issue (for example disappearances), which coupled with rampant impunity and the repetitive failure of the State in question to implement the orders of the Inter-American Court, create serious reasons for concern, and which have therefore required the system in question to place greater focus on the point and to find ways to pressure the respective State to address the situation it faces. We have in mind here the way in which the Inter-American bodies have imposed on states stricter investigatory obligations as regards systemic cases, than either the African or European systems have yet had cause to do.
Following on from this, the varied socio-political contexts of the three regional systems undoubtedly account for certain differences in the case-law. While all three mechanisms recognise the right to know the truth, the states in the Americas turned this right into a pivotal element of their transitional justice processes as at the very least, repressive dictatorships in the region were ready to allow some truth instead of criminal accountability processes. The way criminal investigations were a trade-off in the region, forced the Inter-American System to take a stand on the issue and to establish that while the right to know the truth is a clear entitlement under the American Convention, it is intrinsically related to the obligation to investigate (as well as to other rights) so, truth without justice is not allowed under the American Convention. This stands in contrast with the European jurisprudence that appears to allow truth without justice if certain conditions are met.
Where there are significant differences in approach, such as for the award of reparations, this may be attributed to a variety of factors, including the drafting histories of the respective treaties.
For example, some commentators on the Inter-American system have alluded to the intention of those who were involved in drafting the American Convention to ensure that the Inter-American Court had broad powers to order reparations, 150 whereas that was not the case as regards the European Court. 151 The greater gravity and scale of cases before the Inter-American and African systems may be another reason why those systems have been prepared to take the issue of reparations a good deal further than the European Court. It can also be explained if the human rights regional courts see their role as one of exercising corrective justice, whereby they not only address the violations and the harm caused by human rights abuses, but they also try to trigger structural changes for vulnerable communities that have been affected by them.
As we have discussed, the European Court's approach to redress has been developed in recent years, albeit more often through its use of recommendations. The Inter-American Court's redress provisions are included within its operative provisions, and are therefore unquestionably legally binding, but that was not the case as regards the European Court's recent stipulations in Abuyeva, Aslakhanova or Association '21 December 1989', which therefore can only be (strictly) considered as 'recommendations'. Divergent attitudes towards redress are also a consequence of differences in the roles that the respective treaty bodies are expected to play with respect to reparations and in follow up on decisions. Whereas the Inter-American bodies, and to a certain extent the African Commission, are more willing to specify the actions the state must take in 150 order to comply with its decision, in the European system it is the Committee of Ministers, not the European Court, which has the task of supervising the execution of judgments. 152 This does not mean that the Court, as amplified by Judges Spielmann, Ziemele and Kalaydjieva in their concurring opinion in Varnava 'should not play any part in the matter and should not take measures designed to facilitate the Committee of Ministers' task in discharging these functions', 153 but it does explain the lack of detail in its judgments when compared with the Inter-American and African bodies. Indeed, we would argue that if the European Court is now empowered to include in its operative provisions, for example, a requirement that an applicant who was unlawfully dismissed be reinstated, 154 then it would also seem to be possible for it to order a respondent state, in a case concerning an unresolved killing or disappearance, to carry out an effective investigation.
We have detected a considerable degree of borrowing of concepts and jurisprudence from and between each of the regional bodies, particularly around general concepts. This is not always consistently applied and it is not always clear why the jurisprudence and practice of the other bodies are not acknowledged. For example, there have been significant developments in the 
